Contradicting Kuhn’s Popular Notion of Scientific Revolution: Conservative Revolutionaries in the History of Science

Thomas Kuhn's work "The Structure of Scientific Revolutions" (1962), which is still frequently cited, was particularly influential in the humanities, but is now also receiving considerable attention from natural scientists, who – unlike historians of science and philosophers of science – in most cases do not critically discuss Kuhn's theses. According to Kuhn, science advances in phases of paradigm-driven "normal science," which are punctuated by revolutions that alter entire scientific frameworks. These revolutions are not designed by rational debates, and they are not progressive.

Using examples of major innovations in the history of chemistry and biology, such as "the chemical revolution" and the (macro)molecular revolution, as well as the scientists involved, I fundamentally call into question Kuhn's ideas of scientific revolutions, for example:

• A revolutionary scientific discovery does not have to change whole scientific frameworks; there is often continuity, and previous knowledge can be of great importance for groundbreaking new research.
• Changes of guiding principles or paradigms are not primarily caused by "anomalies" but by the accumulation of experimental evidence, technical progress, and new ideas.
• Contrary to Kuhn's claims, subsequent paradigms are not incommensurable, sciences progress (and sometimes regress), and scientists do aim at finding better representations of "what nature is really like."

I close by highlighting some problematic consequences of the increasing popularity of Kuhn's work among scientists.